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REVIEWS
THE REPORT OF THE COMMfISSION ON STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE GOVERNon OF CONNECTICUT.
Hartford, Conn., 1950. Pp. 154.
IT is not surprising that the Hoover Commission set a pattern for "little
Hoover Commissions" at the state level.1 There is widespread interest in
improving executive organization and management in the sphere of government.
In many states, interest in governmental reorganization long antedates the
recent Federal study. Other state inquiries are not being confined to the
executive branch, and there is at least talk of constitutional revision in a
number of states.2 Perhaps the most significant feature of the new constitution
of New Jersey is the reorganization of the state judicial system which it has
brought about.3
The Connecticut Commission on State Government Organization was set
up by statute to "study all functions of State Government." 4 It did no less.
The report of the group relates to all three branches and even proposes, in
draft form, a revision of the state constitution.
While I am not qualified to discuss the Connecticut report in terms of the
"practical" political climate of the state, it is in order to indicate at once that
the document has received a wintry reception in the legislature. The special
session, convened to consider the recommendations, adjourned after enacting
only a few piecemeal measures relating to executive organization.5 On April
18, in a second special message on the subject, the Governor had receded from
his original position of urging effectuation of the report in toto and offered
1. Reorganization studies have been undertaken in twenty states and two territories.
Bane, As the States Enter 1950, 23 STATE Gov RMENT 4, 7 (1949). They are Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, 2in-
nesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. See 22 STATE Govmm-
MEIT 229 (1949).
2. See Graves, Constitutions in TuE Boor, OF THE STATES 1950-51, 81.
3. Harrison, Judicial Reform in New Jersey, 22 STATE GovrmNmhrE 232 (1949).
4. Conn. Spec. Act 28 of 1949, § 3. While the Commission is frequently referred to
herein in the past tense in view of the completion of its primary study, it is to be noted
that its legal life continues until April 1, 1951.
5. In a post-mortem pamphlet issued in June, 1950 by the Democratic State Central
Committee under the heading The Set-Back for Good Government in Connecticut 1950,
there is a score sheet designed to show how the Democratic Senate went down the line
for the Commission proposals only to have reorganization killed by the Republican House.
The House "adjourned" on May 25, 1950, without the concurrence of the Senate. The
latter stayed in session another day and completed action substantially in line with the
Commission report.
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a number of frank compromise proposals." The effort was ineffectual. Partisan
lines had been drawn and hope of an accord vanished.
Quite apart from political considerations, it is a pleasure to record, at this
point, independent judgment that the report is a splendid contribution to the
cause of good government and ill deserves the treatment it has thus far received.
The organization and procedures of the Commission have been well described
elsewhere by Mr. Ralph P. Sollott, Staff Director of the study3 lie states that
the five prominent men who made up the commission were of such caliber as
to induce bipartisan agreement. The chairman was Carter W. Atkins, Execu-
tive Director of the Connecticut Public Expenditure Council.8 The Commis-
sion early prepared a Program and Policy Statement to define its understanding
of its mission and guide the technical staff thereafter assembled to do the spade
work.
The 202 state agencies were allocated to 22 survey units. Each commissioner
served as sub-committee chairman for four or five survey projects. Mr. Sollott
states that even though less than seven months were available for the study, the
use of three months in recruiting staff was a wise expenditure of time since each
project director was required, before he was definitely employed, to submit an
outline of his proposed assignment which would be helpful in determining what
it would take to do the job.
The names of the project directors made up a distinguished list. One of
this group, Dr. Harvey C. Mansfield, Chairman of the Political Science De-
partment of The Ohio State University, served as editor-writer for the Com-
mission in the actual composition of the final report. He succeeded in couching
it in simple, direct language with a sound common-sense flavor.
The report is a brief affair; the main body of it occupies 81 pages. Ten "acts"
to accomplish the program, together with brief explanations, take up 73 more.
The survey unit reports were not published with the Commission report. An
interesting feature of the intragovernmental and public relations efforts of the
Commission was the piecemeal release of the ten chapters of the report proper
and of the "acts" proposed to implement it. This was done in February 1950.
The General Assembly convened in special session on March 9.
Financial Management
The Commission found that fiscal functions were widely scattered and
responsibility diffused, lacking both the needed authority in the Governor and
the machinery for centralized management. The Report therefore would do
6. Come. PuB. Doc. No. 3.
7. All the Functions of State Government, 23 STATE, GovmxuvtiET 81 (1950).
8. The others were James L. Loomis, retired chairman of the board of the Con-
necticut Mutual Life Insurance Company; Oliver B. Ellsworth (a Connecticut name with
which to conjure), President of the Riverside Trust Company and the Portland Trust
Company; G. Keith Funston, President of Trinity College; and James G. Rogers, Jr., a
prominent management consultant.
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away with the elective offices of comptroller and treasurer and, in keeping
with a strong body of current opinion,9 set up a single finance department
headed by a director appointed by and serving at the discretion of the Governor.
This one department would serve the entire state functions of revenue, treasury
and control accounting. The Commission favored an annual budget prepared
in the executive establishment on a "performance" basis, such as that recom-
mended by the Hoover Commission, and urged that appropriations follow the
budget form. It suggested that the item veto of the governor be extended to
permit reduction as well as outright disapproval of an item.'0 All of this was
with a view to more intelligent review of budget requests, to more effective
expenditure control and to better evaluation of performance. It tied in with
a separate recommendation that the legislature meet annually instead of bien-
nially.
The Commission made strong point of the difficulty of achieving centralized
fiscal management so long as the state had over 100 special funds which tied
up a third of state receipts "in arbitrary amounts for restricted purposes, regard-
less of relative need."" It recommended that all special funds be merged into
the state general fund. This provoked spirited opposition by persons interested
in particular funds and in his compromise message of April 18, 1950, the
Governor suggested the continuance of five of the special funds.
Executive Reorganitation
Perhaps the Commission recommendations on executive reorganization were
the ones which called forth the strongest opposition. The Commission identi-
fied over 180 agencies in the executive branch. It favored a short ballot
confined to the governor and lieutenant governor. It proposed the organization
of all executive activities, apart from the office of governor, in fourteen oper-
ating departments, and three central service agencies concerned with (1)
personnel, (2) public works, and (3) supplies, space and records, each with
a single head appointed by the governor and to serve at his discretion.'- It
frowned upon the use of boards and commissions for administrative manage-
ment but recommended departmental adjudication boards, with some indepen-
dence from executive control, to perform adjudicative functionsPa The
report stresses the value of citizen participation in giving advice to administra-
9. SH LTZ, AA cA PuBLic Fi-;AN E 118 (3rd ed. 1942).
10. The Commission's statement, on page 10, that the existing item veto is "too
clumsy an instrument" bears striking resemblance to a comment by this reviewer about
the Ohio provision. Fordham, Some Aspects of Constitutional REision in Ohio, 23 Onio
B.J. 181, 185 (1950).
11. REPoRT, at 13.
12. The REoPRT (p. 31) suggests an exception as to the appointment and removal of
the Education Commissioner.
13. The Commission proposed the adoption of an administrative procedure act gov-
erning rule-making and adjudicative procedure. REPrOr, at 107, 10S.
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tive agencies through citizen advisory boards; the Commission proposed a
citizens advisory council for each department.
While there was a tendency at first to be "fairminded" and reserve criticism,
open opposition to, this proposed centralization of authority and responsibility
was to be expected and emphatically did come. The most obvious plaint was
that the plan would make the governor a dictator. This charge in many minds
came to be associated with Governor Chester Bowles, the Democratic incum-
bent. Many boards and commissions, moreover, had been dignified by the
respect in which individual members were held. A decrease in elective offices
is opposed to the particular interests of those in office and their followers as
well as the professional politician who prefers to depend on his chances with
the voters.
Actually the Commission was both relying upon the analogy to the office
of the President in the Federal Government and following, in the main, the
course of Connecticut's Cross Commission of 1937 and the respected and far-
from-radical Hoover Commission. It is supported, moreover, by developments
in local government; the city manager plan, with its centralization of executive
management, has gained a great deal in popularity in recent years.14 The
validity of any suggestion that diffusion of responsibility among a number of
elected officers would be either more democratic or conduce more effectively
to good management would be very difficult to demonstrate. This is the more
clear under the Connecticut Commission proposals, for, in addition to the
enlarged possibility of informed voting and to clear-cut accountability, the
governor would be subject to recall.
Organization is not static. Thorough overhauling does not obviate the need
of later changes. Thus, the Commission proposed that the Governor be em-
powered to promulgate reorganization plans, subject to legislative "veto,"
much as the President may do under the Reorganization Act of 1949.15
Personnel Management
Here the Commission adopted a positive philosophy which improved on the
Hoover Commission attack at the federal level. It would expect a new central
office of personnel services to (1) emphasize positive recruitment; (2) review
thoroughly existing job classifications; (3) initiate and support employee
training programs; (4) develop performance standards for common skills;
(5) establish regular grievance procedures; and (6) foster better welfare
services for employees.
The Legislative Branch
Connecticut's bicameral legislature is made up of a 36-member Senate,
representation in which is supposed to be based on population, and a House
14. See current data in THz MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 1950 245 et seq.
15. Pub. L. No. 109, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (June 20, 1949).
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whose 272 members come from 169 towns. Each town has at least one repre-
sentative; those of over 5,000 have two. Since the latest reapportionment was
effected in 1903, the integrity of the population basis for the Senate has not
been preserved. To an outsider the situation in the House bears a marked
resemblance to the notorious rotten borough system in pre-1832 England and
makes the rule of Ohio and a number of other states assuring each county at
least one seat in the lower house look splendidly democratic by comparison."0
The Commission could not reach a consensus on apportionment of the legis-
lature as a whole. It did propose to leave the Senate unchanged except for the
suggestion that responsibility for decennial reapportionment be transferred
from the General Assembly to a commission of three, who, unlike the legislative
body, would be compellable by judicial process to perform their duties.17 The
Commission members also agreed that the House was too large and proposed
that the number be decreased by allowing but one representative from each towvn
or city, as a step in the right direction. The effect of this, of course, would beto
render inequality in representation even greater. This is a far cry from the
proposal of the cognizant survey units that the legislature be unicameral and
that the members be chosen from electoral districts based on population.18 A
single policy body of modest size would appear ideal for a small compact
political unit like Connecticut.
Other major changes proposed by the Commission were: (a) annual sessions
without time limits, (b) a ban on multiple office-holding by legislators, (c) a
material increase in legislative pay and allowances, and (d) a ban on "local or
special legislation."' 9  Noteworthy also is that the draft constitution is so
worded as to make it clear that the legislature could convene itself in special
session and, thus, would not be completely subject to executive discretion in
this respect.2°
Conspicuous in their absence are provisions-common to many states-for
unitary subject matter in a statute, for statutory titles identifying legislative
subjects and for setting out laws or sections of laws being amended at length.2 1
The Commission gave proper recognition to the legislature's need of techni-
cal assistance in research, drafting and housekeeping services. It proposed
the establishment of an Office of Legislative Services to provide all these aids
under the direction of a well-paid executive.
16. Lz oIsLAr=vs APPoRriONIImEN 16 (Bureau of Pub. Admin., Univ. of Calif., 1941).
17. Many will remember the stalwart but futile efforts of the late John B. Fergus to
compel reapportionment action by the Illinois legislature. Fergus v. Marks, 321 IlL 510,
152 N. E. 557 (1926).
18. Braden and Cahill, A New Contistution for Connecclcu--Part I, 24 Coml.
BAR J. 121, 144 (1950).
19. In the draft constitution this appears in a separate article largely concerned with
local government.
20. ART CLE TnRn, § 5. See Braden and Cahill, sipra note 18, at 150.
21. E.g., OHIo CoNsT. ART. II § 16.
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The Courts
The Commission beamed upon the State's two constitutional courts, the
Supreme Court of Errors and the Superior Court. With respect, however, to
the six types of lesser tribunals-the common pleas, probate, municipal, justice
of the peace and juvenile courts and the Traffic Court of Danbury-it embraced
the view that drastic reform was necessary. Documentation for the Commis-
sion findings and recommendations may be found in the able and forthright
survey unit report on the courts prepared by Federal Circuit Judge Charles E.
Clark, Project Director, with the assistance of his son, Professor Elias Clark.22
It is not feasible to list here the many grounds for dissatisfaction with the
inferior courts. It may simply be noted, by way of illustration, that the juris-
diction of the common pleas courts, units of a state-wide system, is partly ex-
clusive, partly concurrent with that of the Superior Court and partly concurrent
with that of the minor courts, without at the same time being clearly defined;
that municipal, justice of the peace and probate courts are proliferated on a
local basis without the dignity, freedom from political control and remuneration
to attract competent judges and win public esteem; that the 120 probate judges,
elected to serve in as many districts, are largely laymen and are compensated
on a discredited fee basis, which results in annual pay varying from a pittance
to a lush $40,000; and that there is serious lack of coordination. The Commis-
sion adopted the recommendation of the Clark report that the solution of the
problem lay in establishing a unified state judicial system, following the mag-
nificent lead of New Jersey, where unification of the court system, as projected
in the constitutional revision of 1947, has been achieved.2 3  The following
excerpt firom the Clark report gives us the principal structural elements in the
plan.
"Specifically there would be one judicial department under the administrative
direction of the Chief Justice and such staff as may be necessary for control
and allocation of personnel, fiscal and financial payments and accounting, and
the collection of statistics of court business and operation (now so sadly lack-
ing as to all the minor courts). The Division for the trial of cases of general
jurisdiction would be limited to the Superior Court, which should absorb the
present trial jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas. The Division for the
trial of cases now heard by the municipal and justice courts would be that of
either common pleas or district courts of sufficient territorial extent and judicial
power to command the services and justify the salaries of competent judges.
The Probate Division should follow a similar course, with, quite obviously,
abandonment of the notorious fee system of support of the judges. Special
22. This report is presently available in mimeographed form only. For a condensed
discussion of the proposed reforms in Connecticut, as a case study of generally desirable
reforms, see the Clarks' article, p. 1395, supra.
23. See Harrison, supra note 3.
[Vol. 591546
divisions, such as that for the Juvenile Court, could be incorporated into or
added to the department as policy demands."2 4
As projected by the Commission the revamped and unified judicial system
would consist of five divisions: The Supreme Court of Errors, the Superior
Court, the Common Pleas, the Family Court and Probate. There was a further
important recommendation that by statute broad rule-making authority be
granted or confirmed to the Supreme Court of Errors in order to achieve both
improvement and uniformity in practice and procedure.
Effectuation of the proposals was to be left to the General Assembly save for
probate court reform; the probate courts now have constitutional status. The
existing pattern of appointment of Supreme and Superior court judges by the
General Assembly, upon nomination by the Governor, would be extended to
all state judges. What has aroused the critics is the proposal that the terms of
office of the judges be left to statutory determination. As has already been
well-stated, this does not destroy tenure; it rests responsibilty upon the legisla-
ture.25 It appears, moreover, that the Commission is willing to accede to
judicial terms being fixed by the constitution.20
Local Govermncnt
The Commission would abolish county government. To this end the draft
constitution omits all reference to the office of sheriff. The town has always
been the basic general-function unit of local government in Connecticut and
the Commission makes a good case for putting an end to the ill-developed county
governments and turning their functions over to state agencies.
There are no Connecticut constitutional limitations precluding local legisla-
tion relating to local government. The old system of special legislation
governing towns and cities, long since proscribed in many states,?' remains
the order of the day. The Commission was on the very soundest ground in
condemning this system in strong terms; the point is too clear to require
elaboration.28 To effectuate this conclusion the draft constitution forbids local
and special legislation, except as otherwise provided, and the only exception
as to local government has to do with legislative consent to interlocal arrange-
ments. The need for the exception is not apparent to this reviewer. Provision
can be made by general law for interlocal agreements, for boundary changes
and for consolidation of local units. This is a commonplace in other states.
24. At p. 18.
25. Braden and Cahill, supra note 18, at 167, 168.
26. Ibid.
27. SUTHmAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUCrIo §§ 2101, 2111 (3rd ed. 1943).
28. Concerning the evils of special chartering in a sister state, vwhich has since pro-
scribed it, see Fordham, The WVest Virgiia Municipal Home Rule Proposal, 33 NV. VA.
L.Q. 235 (1932).
29. As to functional consolidation, see, for example, MnNN. STAT. Axsr. §471.59
(1945).
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The "draft" ordains that general legislation "shall" provide reasonable
classifications. This is broadly referable to general legislation but it was
doubtless conceived in relation to legislation on local government. It may be
questioned whether it adds anything; the prohibition would not preclude
reasonable classification and surely it is not desired that this clause be interpreted
to require that every general law provide classifications.
The Commission favored home rule for towns, boroughs and cities in the
sense of authority to make and change their charters of government. The
draft purports to confer this power directly but leaves it to the legislature to
prescribe the manner of its exercise. The legislature is commanded to provide
an optional charter system for units which do not exercise "their charter
powers." Home rule would extend to all the "local and municipal affairs"80
of a unit subject to legislative authority to exercise, by general law, reasonable
control over municipal affairs to protect the interests of the state. This
legislative power, it is solemnly declared, is not to be construed to deny local
self-government.
Descriptively, it is to be observed that the proposal does not call for full-
fledged constitutional home rule since enabling legislation must be passed to
provide the procedure for the exercise of "charter powers" and the availability
of substantive home rule powers depends upon the adjective process of charter-
making.31
With respect to the policy of home rule it has long been the considered
position of this reviewer (1) that the assumed distinction between local affairs
and matters of state concern is, apart from the world of broad political ideas,
fuzzy and incapable of reasonably satisfactory application and (2) that to
give local units areas of authority beyond the control of the state government
is out of harmony with well-grounded contemporary ideas about public adminis-
tration, which stress purpose and function and the flexibility in organization
and distribution of powers required to get the job done. Constitutional home
rule overemphasizes relatively fixed geographical areas which, quite commonly,
do not conform to actual service areas.
Local autonomy is a justly-cherished value. I suggest that the heart of it is
local responsibility for the conduct of public business at the local level, including
the raising of the bulk of the revenue required for the purpose. This can be
preserved and strengthened under a system of general laws providing a liberal
grant of substantive powers and great flexibility as to choice of governmental
forms. It is significant that the New Jersey constitutional revision of 1947
definitely rejected home rule,32 that the revision sought to reverse conventional
30. ARTIcLE EIGHTH, § 2.
31. Ohio is among a minority of home rule states in which substantive home rule
powers are granted directly by the constitution and do not depend on charter-making.
Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgeway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 593 (1923).
32. See ARTICLE FOURTH, § 7, Pars. 9, 10. There is no positive provision for and,
thus, no home rule.
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strict constructionist treatment of municipal powersPm and that the legislature
has recently adopted a liberal optional charter law.3 4 A system like this should
work well in a political and judicial climate favorable to local government, and,
at the same time, preserve legislative freedom of action in an era of exceedingly
rapid social change. Without such an atmosphere not even the broadest formal
grant of home rule will avail.
Why, in any event, grant charter powers to every town, borough and city,
however small? In Ohio there are some 800 villages (municipalities of less than
5,000 population). Of these not more than a half-dozen have adopted home
rule charters. The crux of the home rule problem is and always has been the
larger centers.35
Popular Legislation
The draft constitution contains provisions for the initiative and the optional30
referendum, which are designed to be self-executing. The initiative would
apply to any subject of legislation but approval by two-thirds rather than a
simple majority of the electors voting would be required with respect to an
initiated appropriation or tax measure or one "dealing with matters not common
to the State as a whole."37 There would be an outright exception under the
referendum in favor of emergency measures passed by a two-thirds majority
"of the General Assembly" but no other-not even current appropriation
measures.
The draftmen have properly made the point that a self-executing provision
of a constitution should be characterized by tight legalistic drafting.-S There
is reason to doubt, however, that they achieved it in this article of the draft.
(1) The legislature may enact an initiated measure or it may reject it and, in
the latter event, may propose a different measure on the same subject. Does
this mean that the legislature could not formally amend even to correct a
blatant error but would have to propose the correction in a complete new
measure? (As a matter of policy would it not be better, in any event, to permit
legislative adoption of an initiated measure in amended form, subject to further
petition for referendum?) (2) The referendum would apply to any "part of
any measure." 39 Does this mean a sentence or a clause or a word as distin-
guished from a section or separately identified subdivision of a section? (As a
matter of substance, how can we justify referendum, even as to sections, any
more than we could executive veto of separate sections of non-appropriation
33. ATc= FouRrn, § 7, Par. 11.
34. This measure was enacted only this year and the correct reference to the session
laws is not available to the writer.
35. See Lynagh, Wisconsin "Unshackles" her Ciies, 18 NAT. MuN. REv. 737 (1929).
36. Voluntary submission by the legislature is the "voluntary" referendum; that at
the instance of petitioners, the "optional" referendum. RoBERT LucE; LnSrr.iiW Pam~-
CpL-Zs 599 (1930).
37. ARucLa SEVENTH, § 4.
3. Braden and Cahill, supra note 18, at 124.
39. ARTCL= SEvENrH, § 3.
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measures ?40 Since the filing of a petition against a part would not prevent
the remainder of a measure from becoming effective, bizarre consequences
might well be produced.41) (3) The scheme of Section 2 of this article is that
an initiated measure must first go to the legislature to give it a chance to enact
it or propose a different measure, yet Section 4 lays it down that an initiated or
referendum measure shall become law if approved by a majority of the votes
cast thereon "and not otherwise." (The draft does not adequately protect
legislative opportunity to consider an initiated measure. It permits presentation
to the General Assembly late in a session.) (4) When it comes to emergency
measures no attempt is made to tell us whether the fact of emergency is
justiciable. This is a familiar question which could be laid to rest by the drafts-
men. (5) There is the further question whether the legislature could repeal
or modify a law approved by the voters. If it could and if the legislative deter-
mination of emergency were final, legislative repeal of an initiated measure
could be made to "stick." (6) Is "two-thirds majority of the General As-
sembly" referable to two-thirds of each house? (7) Initiative and referendum
petitions are submitted to the governor. The article does not attempt to clarify
the function of the governor in this connection. There may be a question as to
the extent of his authority in passing upon the sufficiency of petitions or, in
other words, as to the extent of judicial review of his action in this respect.
(8) Does "common to the state as a whole" refer to commonality of interest
in the subject matter or uniformity of application?42
The real point of these comments, in the larger view, is that the drafting of a
constitution, particularly if it is to contain self-executing provisions, is no
mean assignment. The draftsmen, in this instance, were no doubt handicapped
with respect both to available time and to interplay of ideas. I wish it clearly
understood, moreover, that this critical treatment of one article is not an attack
40. Concerning Ohio's ill-conceived, but happily shortlived, section veto see Tuttle,
History of the Executive Veto in the Ohio Constitution, 2 Omo ST. L.J. 99, 107 (1936).
41. Thus, a petition might be addressed to the levy clause of a tax measure. This
would permit administrative and other provisions to go into effect at once, although the
levy clause is obviously not separable.
It is to be further noted that Section 4 provides that "any measure" subjected to
referendum shall become law only if approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon.
Is this consistent with the idea that the remainder of a measure may take effect where
the referendum is invoked as to a part?
42. Perhaps the following questions could be resolved by legislation enacted under
Section 9 to facilitate the operation of the article. (1) How does one determine the "ten
per cent of the electors" required as signatories of an initiative petition? (2) May pe-
titions be presented in separate parts? (This is a matter of some practical importance).
(3) How are petitions to be verified? The recall section expressly requires the governor
to verify, but verification is not mentioned under the head of initiative and referendum.
The draftsmen have with laudable candor acknowledged a discrepancy which occurred
in relating the veto clause to the referendum provisions and have indicated how to re-
move it. Braden and Cahill, slupra note 18, at 161-163.
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on their draft as a whole. It is directed simply and solely at one self-executing
part of the instrument, a part exceedingly difficult to prepare.
Only one comment with respect to the larger considerations of policy affect-
ing a system of popular legislation will be offered here. It can be put in the
form of a question: Is popular legislation consistent with the short ballot?
Conclusion
In a final word, my estimate of the report of the Commission is that its work
on the executive branch and upon the courts is particularly outstanding, that
most of its recommendations as to the legislature are very constructive but that
some of its major proposals as to local government and popular legislation
merit further study. Let those who are concerned with good government close
to home, particularly in relation to the problem of maintaining a satisfactory
Federal-State balance in our scheme of things, ponder well the implications of
rejecting such an opportunity as now exists in Connecticut to improve and
strengthen state and local government. JErFERSoN B. FORDITAM-*
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LAW AND AccOuNTING. By Donald
Schapiro and Ralph 1Aienshienk. University Casebook Series. Brooklyn:
The Foundation Press, Inc. 1949. Pp. xxi, 935. $8.00.
MIATEIALS ON AcCOUNTING. By Robert Amory, Jr. University Casebook
Series. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1949. Pp. x-xiii, 781. $7.00.
IT is no longer necessary to point out the vital need of a knowledge of ac-
counting to the practicing lawyer, and the consequent importance of ac-
counting instruction in law school. But except for the pioneer work of
Graham and Katz,' there has been little textbook exposition designed pri-
marily for lawyers, and never heretofore a "casebook" or selection of judicial
and administrative decisions and administrative and professional pronounce-
ments and other materials on the field of accounting as related to the law.
Both of these casebooks are splendid. Even for a reviewer who had an
"advanced" course in corporate accounting before entering law school,
they evoke feelings of regret that he had not had the benefit of such concrete
introductions to the business and legal significance of accounting before he
took his business law courses. And a reviewer who has struggled to im-
part to younger lawyers the "expertise" in legal-accounting questions which
they were supposed to have as part of the staff of a federal administrative
agency daily concerned with problems of corporate disclosure, fairness, and
feasibility can only think of the hours that the trainees' law school study of
either of these books would have saved him and them.
1fDean of the College of Law, Ohio State University.
1. GRAHAM AND KArz, ACcOUNTI NG IN LAW PRAcrscE (1st ed. 1932; 2d ed. 1938);
KATZ, I=RoDnoCxoN To AccoUNTING FOR STuDENTs oF LAw (3d ed. 1948).
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To venture into detailed comparison of the books, and particularly into a
judgment on their relative suitability for classroom use, would be a danger-
ous undertaking for one with no law teaching experience, particularly when
a major problem in the formulation of a course on law and accounting must
be the integration of the course with the business law and tax courses of the
curriculum. If I were otherwise more daring, the spectacle of two law
teachers and editors experienced in this field hurling pithy adjectives at
each others' productions2 would give me pause. Suffice it to say that both
prefaces admit that there is more in the related book than can be taught in a
relatively short course, and that to this reviewer it comes as a pleasant sur-
prise to learn that even a substantial portion of either of these collections
can be taught in a short course to students starting with no knowledge of
accounting. My first reaction was that the caliber of law teaching or the
caliber of law students must have shown remarkable improvement in the
less than twenty years since I walked a university campus. But further
study shows that in each book the extremely compact summary of the tech-
nique of double entry bookkeeping with which the book begins-probably
beyond the ability of students to retain if standing alone-is reviewed and
expanded and drilled, through extraordinarily able editing jobs, in annota-
tions, questions and problems.
The core of the materials in both books is the same (as might be ex-
pected), and both contain so much material that they permit any teacher to
throw the emphasis of his course in any way he chooses. Yet the books
seem to reveal differences in the editors' conceptions of the subject-matter,
and these differences, while they should not be over-emphasized, are worthy
of comment.
Schapiro and Wienshienk title their book to show that it includes ma-
terials on law and accounting, and in their preface they state their purpose
to emphasize "accounting as a tool in the lawyer's kit." On the other hand,
while Amory's subtitle shows that the book is designed for law students, he
titles his book to emphasize materials on accounting alone. He disclaims an
intention to treat "legal accounting", and announces his purpose "to provide
a solid theoretical grounding in accounting as a universal language without
which our industrial society could not exist."
Consistently with their approach, Schapiro and Wienshienk organize their
material by legal topics: contractual litigation, the corporate enterprise,
public utility regulation, trusts and estates. Consistently with his con-
trasting approach, Amory organizes his materials squarely on the concept
of accounting defined as a process of matching costs against revenues.
Having in mind that the function of the course is to teach accounting, not
merely another field of law, and having in mind also that the bulk of the
2. See Amory, Book Review of KATz, INTRoDucrn x ro AccouNTINo VOR STUDENT5
OF LAW (3d ed. 1948), 2 J. LzGA. EDUc. 112 (1949) ; and Katz, Book Review of tho two
casebooks herein under review, in 63 H.nv. L. Rnv. 1282 (1950).
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books must serve to expand and drill the compressed explanation of ac-
counting techniques in the introductory chapters, the Amory structure seems
to me to be the more logical, and his organization of the non-legal materials
more satisfactory.
In accordance with their basic conception, Schapiro and Wienshienk use a
substantially greater quantity of judicial case material than does Amory,
and both books, in my opinion, use too much. Amory himself recognizes
that the courts are fifty years behind the profession of accountancy,3 and
that most judicial decisions on accounting questions are "a chamber of
horrors".4 Then why use so many of them? Amory has the objective of
giving the student "an acquaintance with the more frequent errors untrained
courts fall into when confronted with poorly presented accounting ques-
tions." 5 Possibly it is useful to give the student a sense of thankfulness that
he will never sound as stupid as the courts on an accounting question, but
this could be done without so many examples. The substantive accounting
issues that have been presented to the courts, with relatively few exceptions,
have been non-recurring, and not illustrative of broad problems. The re-
sulting decisions, in my opinion, are usually not worth reading or teaching,
except for a few samples as a prelude to the question, "Could this litigation
have been avoided by proper drafting?" That question, unfortunately, is
not sufficiently asked in the notes and problems in either book.
Hand in hand with knowledge of accounting as a lawyer's tool goes a
facility with figures. The law student "whom the very prospect of working with
figures brings to the verge of panic" will not go far as a financial lawyer,
unless real work with financial statements persuades him to take a plunge
into the sea of arithmetic. The lawyer working with financial materials
cannot safely be passive when confronted with accountants' figures. He
must learn how they were derived; otherwise, he runs the risk of finding that
he has been working with the end product of erroneous and sometimes pre-
posterous assumptions. Schapiro and Wienshienk invite the plunge here, as
part of the course. Their footnotes and problems ingeniously challenge the
student to find how the figures were put together. In fact, their collection
of recapitalization cases goes far beyond anything which could narrowly
be classified as accounting, to the point where they are teaching the arith-
metic and law of fairness.
I have some doubt that so brief a course covering so wide a field is really
the place to try to teach figure thinking, valuable as it is. I have the same
reaction to Amory's emphasis on such figure techniques as ratio analysis and
trend analysis. Not that the materials are not valuable for the student to
have at hand. But in a contest of values, I believe that the limited time
3. Amory, at p. 303.
4. Amory, Book Review, 2 J. LEGAL EDuc- 112, 116 (1949).
5. Amory, Book Review, 2 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 112, 113-14 (1949).
6. Katz, Book Review, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1282 (1950).
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available could better be devoted to other matters-for instance, to the
utterly fascinating collection of actual corporate reports with which Amory
has concretely illustrated the significance of accounting problems. No-
where have I seen a body of materials to compare with this collection of
reports in making accounting issues appear as matters of importance affect-
ing management and finance, in contrast with the feeling of abstractness
which is the curse of accounting textbooks.
Having reached an understanding of the techniques and the importance of
accounting, the law student should still face some important questions:
"What more is accounting than a technique of double entry? What are
accounting principles? What are accounting facts ?" Amory, while recog-
nizing in his preface that accounting is "utilitarian art", accepts too readily
the thesis that it is "a universal language without which our industrial
society could not exist." At least in his written material, he does not chal-
lenge the student to inquire whether another language, with perhaps different
definitions and a different structure, might have been even more useful.
Schapiro and Wienshienk, having chosen to emphasize the relationship
between the different disciplines of law and accounting, are in a better posi-
tion to keep before the student the semantics of accounting. They do so,
probably as adequately as possible in an elementary course, with such ma-
terials as the delightful contrasting quotations which begin their treat-
ments of corporate distributions7 and public utility regulation;8 the direct
study of the use of accounting terminology in dividend statutes ;9 a sophisti-
cated treatment of the regulatory and accounting issues in the public utility
"original cost" controversy,1 ° and a more complete quotation than Amory
uses of Mr. Justice Jackson's thought-provoking comments in the Hope
Natural Gas case. 1
But all this is only a beginning. Accounting as a language of business
badly needs a thorough-going semantic treatment, and that treatment is
7. Pp. 235-36.
8. P. 466.
9. P. 238 et seq.
10. P. 487 et seq.
11. "To make a fetish of mere accounting is to shield from examination the deeper
causes, forces, movements, and conditions which should govern rates. Even as a recording
of current transactions, bookkeeping is hardly an exact science. As a representation of the
conditions and trend of a business, it uses symbols of certainty to express values that actually
are in constant flux. It may be said that in commercial or investment banking or any
business extending credit success depends on knowing what not to believe in accounting."
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co,,
320 U.S. 591, 643 n. 40 (1944). The dissent continues with approving references to
Hamilton, Cost as a Standard of Price, 4 LAW & CONmTMP. PaoB. 321 (1937), the use of
which, without adequate preparation and counterbalance, in an accounting casebook for




more likely to come from persons with the perspective of an allied pro-
fession than from the accountants themselves. The law school is the ideal
place to germinate the thinking. For example:
Is accounting "income" the same income as economists have in mind when
they say that value is the capitalized expectancy of future income?
What is the remaining utility of balance-sheet ratios in investment analysis
and credit analysis, now that the balance sheet is clearly recognized not as a
representation of going-concern or liquidation value but as a summary of
unexpired costs?
How sound are accounting principles as to the capital and surplus account
and their effect on the propriety of dividends, when the regulatory agencies
most zealous in their application are ready to depart from them in the
interest of "regulatory e-pediency" ?12 Is not this regulatory expediency a
common-sense examination of the business facts without submission to the
distortion coming from the structure of what Amory calls the "universal
language .. . [of] our industrial society"?1a
How fundamental, and how worthy of blind acceptance, are accounting
principles which lawyers can invoke or evade by alternative legal tech-
niques? How great, and how healthy, is the impact of accounting classifica-
tion on the development of legal form? Are the growing sale-and-lease-
back of real estate, and the less well-known chattel lease, useful economic
devices with substantial differences from mortgages, or are they just means
of kidding the literal-minded accountants into omitting the liabilities from
the balance sheet?' 4 Is there a difference in fact between a sale of a depart-
ment store's receivables with recourse and a borrowing against them, or is
the significant difference the fact that the accountant will classify one legal
form as a contingent liability and the other as a balance sheet liability? How
meaningful are the regulatory accounting distinctions betw'een "original
cost", "cost to the accounting utility", and "write-up" when the accounting
12. See Northwestern Electric Co. v. Federal Power Consnissi on, 321 U.S. 119 (1944)
and comment on the various stages of the case in Dohr, Public Utility Accounting, 74
J. AccouNTN. c 477 (1942) ; Home, Accounting Principles and Utility Rcgulation, 75
J. AccouNTANcy 261 (1943) ; May, Accounting Principles and Regulatory Expediency, 71
J. AccouNTANcy 116, 117 (1941) ; May, Northwestern, Electric Co., 75 J. AccOUNT,:cy
451 (1943); Colbert, Accounting Principles and Utility Regulation, 75 J. AccoUNTWAcy
360 (1943) ; Kripke, A Case Study in, the Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform
Accounts 100.5 and 107, 57 HARv. L. Rav. 433, 693 at 701 et seq. and 720 (1944).
13. Cf. Konzvaszx, ScIENcE .AND SANITY pp. ii, vi (1933): "[I]n the structure of
our languages ... we preserve delusional, psychopathological factors. These are in no
way inevitable... Few of us realize the unbelievable traps, some of them of a psycho-
pathological character, which the structure of our ordinary language sets before us.'
14. Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Bach of Property: Busi-
ness, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. L. R'v. 1 (1948). The accountants have
recently become more sophisticated on this point. A-micAN INsTrrTrE oF AccoUNTANTS,
Commrrm ON ACcoUNTING PROCEUiz, AccoUN-NG RESF,-Arc BuLu.EmN No. 38, (1949).
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classification can be controlled by the legal techniques through which properties
are transferred ?15
What is the proper scope of accounting principles? Should accountants
be allowed to tell a court as a matter of expert knowledge whether the cost
of funding past service pensions is a current cost of doing business, or does
the management which has negotiated with the union know the answer
better ?13 What good is accounting as a universal language of industry if its
principles control only the symbols which represent an event on the corporate
books, but are not the symbols by which the event is to be classified for
more important purposes like rates and dividends ?17 Are the courts wholly
wrong in creating a dichotomy between "accounting merely"1 8 and the real
problems of our industrial society, or is the "universal language" of the
society inadequate to symbolize its problems? Can the inadequacy, if it
exists, be corrected, or is accounting now as efficient a tool as it can be made?
Accountancy, a profession still in its infancy, has only just begun to be
able to articulate its assumptions. In scarcely twenty years, it has turned
from balance sheet emphasis to income emphasis, from the concept of assets
as list of "property" to the concept of assets as unexpired costs. What had
been deemed conservative because it understated assets is now deemed the
opposite because it inflates future income. A whole revolution has occurred
in thinking about charges otherwise than through the income account.
Other equally drastic changes in accounting thought may yet occur. Books
like those under review will produce a generation of lawyers sophisticated in
accounting questions who may be able to help the accountants in further
refinement of their techniques to provide answers to questions like those
above. The cross-fertilization of the professions may ultimately produce
an accounting language far more useful than that of the present to supply
the many demands for facts in our industrial society.
HOMER KmIPKrt
15. See Kripke, supra note 12, at 693 et seq.
16. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 400 (D. Mass. 1943).
The official position of the accountants changed after the court accepted the testimony of
the accounting experts in this case. AmmucAN INSTITUTE or ACcoUNTANTs, CoMMITTEE
ow ACCOUNTING PROCEDUR, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 36 (1948).
17. See Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. United States, 287 U.S. 134 (1932);
State Corporation Commission of Kansas v. Wichita Gas Company, 290 U.S. 561 (1934);
Am. Tel. and Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936); Northwestern Electric Co.
v. Federal Power Commission, 321 U.S. 119 (1944); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
United States, 53 F. Supp. 400 (D. Mass. 1943). Cf. United States v. New York Tele-
phone Co., 326 U.S. 638 (1946). See Kripke, Accountants' Financial Statements atd
Fact-Finding in the Law of Corporate Regulation, 50 YA L.J. 1180, 1197 et seq. (1941).
18. Mr. Justice Roberts in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. United States, 287 U.S.
134,141 (1932).
t Member New York Bar.
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CASES ON FEDERAL COURTS, SECOND EDITION. By Charles T. McCormick
and James H. Chadbourn. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1950.
Pp. xxix, 921. $8.
THE second edition improves upon the first. And the first edition was a fine
and stimulating casebook.
In the preface to the first edition of 1946 the authors asked: "how soon
will the profession and Congress lay the ground work for a new Code of Fed-
eral Jurisdiction which can do as much for simplifying and rationalizing the
Federal practice as the new Rules have done?" With the Judicial Code of
1948 effecting a partial answer to their question, a revision of the first edition
was in order. Quite naturally it also reflects the case development of the
four-year interim,' and the cases of this period are unusually provocative.
Some of these, with familiar names, are: Angel v. Bullington, a federal court
in a diversity case enforces only such rights as are enforceable in the state
court ;2 United States v. United Mine Workers of America, a restraining order
of a federal district court, that is personally served on the defendant, is not
subject to collateral attack ," Ex parte Collett4 and United States v. National
City Lines,5 the clear provisions of the Code for transfer of "any" civil action
to a more convenient forum plainly apply even to actions involving special
interests; and United Public Workers v. Mitchell,0 Bell v. Hood,7 and National
Mut. Ins. Co. of the District of Columbia v. Tidcwater Transfer Co.,8 the con-
cept of "case or controversy", general federal question, and diversity juris-
diction are, respectively, treated. Incidentally, in presenting the last case the
1. The new edition drops 70 cases and adds 47. This reduction in number is
partially accounted for by the repeal of the assignee clause by the Judicial Code of 1948.
While the number of cases has diminished the book has grown in size from 878 to 921 pages.
Although all of the added cases were not, of course, the product of the interim between
the first and second edition, the added cases are generally of recent vintage and, as sub-
sequently stated in the text, are extremely interesting.
2. 330 U.S. 183 (1947). The capsule statement of the text summarizes only the
aspect of the case immediately related to Erie. The more controversial aspect can be
used either as a springboard for a plunge into the waters of res judicata or as material
supplementing Chapter 6 entitled Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction.
3. 330 U.S. 258 (1947). While the "John L. Lewis" case came as a surprise to some,
its theory had long been established: a court order is usually something more than an idle
piece of paper; when the court has proper jurisdiction over the parties the piece of paper
may represent error but it is not a nullity.
4. 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act).
5. 337 U.S. 78 (1949) (antitrust action by the United States).
6. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
7. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
8. 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (the 1940 statute treating a citizen of the District of Columbia
as a citizen of a "state" for diversity purposes is valid).
While this case appears in Chapter 3 dealing with diversity, I prefer to take it up in
connection with the materials in Chapter 1 because it poses so many fundamental questions
concerning "constitutional" and "legislative" courts and the scope and limitations of
Article III of the Constitution upon judicial power.
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authors have done a fine job in editing down the opinions, from sixty-five pages
in the official report to twenty-one in the casebook, and yet retaining the points
of view and theories of the four separate opinions.
In the matter of cases this reviewer was disappointed to find that the second
edition omitted Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in American Insurance Co.
v. Canterg dealing with territorial and constitutional courts. And the same
comment is applicable to the much less known case, Marshall v. Desert
Properties Co.,10 which presents in craftsmanlike manner the distinction be-
tween a bill to remove a cloud on title and a bill to quiet title in reference to
the presentation of a general federal question. King v. Order of United Com.
nercial Travelers" might well have been elevated from footnote to text and
Fidelity Union Trust Company v. Field'2 demoted to footnote. Both cases
deal with the controlling effect of a state nisi prius decision in a federal court
under Erie; the King case is later, and discusses and qualifies the Field deci-
sion. A line or two of text could have told the tale of Dimick v. Schiedt'a
and Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman"4 to the effect that, unlike remit-
titur, additur is unconstitutional, and that the reservation of decision upon a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict could be made at common
law and was the basis for Rule 50(b). With these cases thus disposed of,
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan,'5 which appears in a footnote to the
Redman case, could have been moved up into the text to illustrate the present
functioning of a motion for judgment n.o.v. or in the alternative for a new
trial. If a choice had to be made between Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,'0 up-
holding the validity of Rule 35 on physical and mental examination, and
Hickman v. Taylor,"7 dealing with the controversial problem as to how far
one party may delve into the files and trial preparation of his adversary, the
latter case should have been chosen. And Flournoy v. Wiener' should have
found its way into Chapter 10 as a most illustrative case of how technical the
mechanics of Supreme Court appellate procedure can become. The case will
amaze small fry acquainted only with professorial "science and policy".
But these are all minor objections, and reflect in large part only the
idiosyncrasies of this reviewer. A more fundamental matter involves praise
rather than criticism. The authors have, quite naturally, given us a case-
book for a specialized course designed to supplement supposedly basic pro-
cedural courses. The tables should be turned. Federal jurisdiction and
9. 1 Pet. 511 (U.S. 1828).
10. 103 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 563 (1939).
11. 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
12. 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
13. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
14. 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
15., 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
16. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
17. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
18. 321 U.S. 253 (1944).
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practice should be the basic procedural course in the law schools. Other
procedural courses, if necessary at all to nod provincially at such states as
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas, would be fillers. Such
suggestions, however, have an appalling effect upon curriculum commit-
tees. For there is nothing like membership on a curriculum committee to
make a black reactionary out of an otherwise normal and forward looking
person. The sadism of Lord Coke and his forms of action, the cant of the
equity pleader, the hodge-podge of code pleading, and the reverence for
by-gone procedures cast a spell. And from the spell, curriculum committees
emerge with today's masquerades that are known as the basic procedural
courses.
This reviewer would like to see the McCormick and Chadbourn expanded
into a two-volume casebook. And to see the e-pansion deal primarily with
federal practice. The casebook would catch on in time. Some day it would
even be conservative enough for the Yale Law School curriculum committee.
Until then the authors have done a fine service for those of us who teach the
specialized course of federal jurisdiction and practice, for McCormick and
Chadbourn have, indeed, given us an excellent casebook.
JAMES WM. Mooant
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGAL MI'ETHOD. CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGAL
SYSTEm. By William T. Fryer and Carville D. Benson. St. Paul: West
Publishing Company, 1949. Legal Method, Pp. xXxvii, 899 pages. Legal
System, Pp. xxix, 535 pages.*
THESE: two volumes are the newest and largest of the materials for the
introduction to law course. Professors Fryer and Benson have built upon a
background of a quarter of a century preparing, teaching, and experimenting
with introductory courses. Among the pioneers in the field, the weight of
their influence has contributed to the steady adoption by most of the Ameri-
can law schools of beginning legal orientation courses.
Perhaps none realize as fully as the authors the nature of the market for
which they write. It is a market which could be described as chaotic were
it not for the presence of an underlying purpose seemingly motivating
teachers of the introductory courses: the purpose being to assist the student
in laying the foundation for adjustment of his mental processes to the law,
to broaden his horizon of the scope of his subject, and to deepen his per-
spective. However, teachers disagree, and their schools disagree, on the
nature of the introductory course which should be given. For example, the
following are selected titles of courses of this type offered by American law
" Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
There is now available a one volume edition of these two volumes. The new edition
is some five hundred pages shorter than the original.
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schools: civil procedure, remedies, legal actions, legal method, legal bibliog-
raphy, legal research, legal history, survey lectures, legal ethics, legal insti-
tutions, legal philosophy, others, and nothing at all. Even where the titles
and the materials are the same, the course content may vary.1 This list
illustrates the character of the problem of writing a satisfactory work to
appease many demands. The evolution of courses of this type shows the
gradual emergence of a demand on the part of law schools for them.2 And
the fact that as yet there are no universally accepted methods or materials
or catalog descriptions is an indication, to me, of a healthy ferment in the
field. Compare the 1434 pages of these two volumes with the 377 pages of
the authors' efforts in 1935 8-much of the increase in size and scope results
from an acceptance of the place of the introductory course in the curriculum
and from the cross fertilization of ideas concerning this course during
the past fifteen years.
In Legal Method the authors seek to lay the foundation for case evaluation,
the development of skills in legal thought within a context of substance
and procedure, the acquisition of a sense of policy formulation beneath the
cases, and the gaining of perspective concerning lawyers' materials and
legal research. The content of the volume is: 139 pages-legal education
and concepts; 124 pages-mechanics of case study; 308 pages-procedure or
remedies; 194 pages-legal language, reasoning and stability in the law;
134 pages-legal bibliography and writing.
In comparison with Legal Method, the volume on Legal System has a
narrower goal which I detect as seeking to illustrate the development and
continuity of basic institutions of the American legal system (with their
roots in the English legal system), to assist the student in acquiring a sense
of professional responsibility, and to help them overcome a feeling of
"verbal reticence," as the authors describe it, concerning the origin, opera-
tion and functions of the legal system. The first 147 pages are devoted to
the English legal system: 59 pages-courts; 60 pages-procedure; 12 pages
-legal profession; and 16 pages-law books. The remaining 387 pages re-
late to the American legal system: 54 pages-origin and growth of Ameri-
can law; 60 pages-developments in courts and tribunals; 98 pages-legal
profession; and 175 pages-restraints on bench and bar.
The spirit of Legal Method is one of scope, depth, intensity, diversifica-
tion, and cleverly successful editorial workmanship. The student begins his
1. "But similarity of name, and even use of the same student book, does not always
vouch for identity of objectives and course content." REPORT OF CUQmcULuxm Coim Mrm,
HANDBOOK OF THE AssocATIoN OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 154 (1948).
2. For evolution of the introductory course see HANDBOO OF THE AssocIATtoN OF
Am=CAN LAW SCHOOLS 142 (1928); id. at 134 (1929); id. at 131 (1930); id. at 148
(1933) ; id. at 173 (1935) ; id. at 276 (1936) ; id. at 125, 154 (1948).




study of law by reading about the objectives of legal education.4 I wish that
I had begun my studies with the perspective of such materials before me;
perhaps I would have been more aware of what my teachers were trying to
do, and so have felt a closer association with them I think, however, that
teaching the objectives of legal education will fall on dumb ears unless the
teacher is prepared to do some gymnastics during the first hour or two of
the class, and perhaps exercise self control in holding down his own pet ideas
in order to give a rounded view of the various attitudes. I have tried this
experiment-it helped me as well as the students. A logical next step is to
illustrate how legal concepts function, and to show the elusive quest of the
courts for a legal "rule" followed through several cases and culminating
with the idea of legal growth and adaptation, or rule change, to meet needs.
These are social needs as mirrored through judges and by cases. This the
student must learn at an early date. Here he sees a great legal writer say
that law is disappearing. This legal writer is challenged by another who
says it is not disappearing.5 Seeing the giants clash removes absoluteness
and engenders scepticism in the young minds at an early date in their legal
careers.
While the mechanics of study cannot be taught to perfection, it seems
better to teach study methods than to leave freshman indoctrination to e.ag-
gerated dissimilarities of individual teachers' techniques; students will soon
learn about teacher differences and will benefit therefrom, but they should
have a standard from which to judge. I have often felt that we miss op-
portunities of converting "C" students into "B" students by failing to assist
them in study orientation.
Having established the foundation of objectives, concept fluidity, and me-
chanics of study, the step into the bulkiest portion of the book is designed
to make the study of cases more understandable by illustrating the pro-
cedural skeleton holding the cases together. The effort here is not to teach
a basic course in procedure but to illustrate the various steps of proceedings
before, at and after trial, and to contrast state and federal procedure both on
the trial and on the appellate levels. This is done by extensive use of records
and briefs much of which, as the authors suggest, may be assigned as
reading. When the student finishes with these materials he should have a
rather broad perception of the procedural processes, minus, of course, those
details and mechanics which must be learned in advanced procedure courses.
I was impressed with the idea of Chapter 8, "Language in Law," but not
particularly with the contents. There is a paucity of the materials on seman-
tics that I expected to find. However, some references to non-legal sources
are given which a teacher might use to explore the subject further. Many
4. Excellent articles showing diverse approaches of Douglas, Cardozo, Pound, Katz,
Lasswell and McDougal, and Fuller.
5. At p. 123 is printed Pound, Disappearance of the Law; at p. 130, Clark, Is Law
Disappearing?
19501 15G1
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
examples could be drawn from first year courses to illustrate hazy thought
due to improper communication. Analytical Jurisprudence, via I-lohfeld,
cannot be understood in twenty pages, but perhaps a few hours could be
devoted to this while the students are reading the last two chapters on legal
bibliography, research and writing.0 In teaching Hohfeld it has been my
experience that it is the idea of orderly analysis which is important for the
student to see and be aware of as he reads his cases. I do not particularly
care if he cannot come up with a "no-right" at the proper moment so long
as he acquires the habit of disciplined analysis.
The authors have conducted what may be a successful experiment in
teaching "Reasoning in Law" by means of articles, interesting cases (on
dogs, goats, cows, elephants and overlapping code provisions) woven around
large portions of Professor Levi's stimulating "Introduction to Legal Rea-
soning." Here is also emphasized the problem of interest weighing and
balancing, and value formulation. Can freshmen grasp this? If they
cannot then they cannot grasp law. This should be the most difficult but
the most rewarding portion of the book.
7
As compared with Legal Method, Legal System is much less complex.
Great portions of it might be assigned for reading without class discussion,
or the teacher might lecture on related topics with the students utilizing the
materials as background. Unlike the companion volume, in Legal System
there is not the immediacy of contact with ideas, nor is there the opportunity
for the student to utilize his new ideas in case courses. While time and
change perspective in the development of English procedure and courts
should be apparent to the student, he will have only fleeting glances of the
dynamic social, political, and economic forces beneath the process of change.
Yet, in property, forms of action, equity, and other courses the details should
be filled in. The English bibliographic materials might have been pre-
sented in Legal Method without injury and with benefit.
The materials on the American legal system contain articles descriptive
of the adaptation of English law to this country, the development and re-
form of our law, uniform state laws, and the emergence and function of ad-
ministrative determinations. The work of judicial councils, law revision,
restating and judicial conferences appear within a context of state and
federal governments. The job of the teacher who covers these materials
6. Chapter eleven takes the facts of a previously studied conversion case and con-
tract for service case and illustrates the law on the subject by quoting typical statutes, codes,
cases, restatements, law reviews, treatises and other materials in full. The authors realize
that the teacher may prepare legal bibliographic problems as supplementary materials,
The results of the authors' own research are certainly enough to shock the student into
the enormity of the job of law tracing and finding. Chapter twelve on legal writing
could furnish the basis of assignments for freshmen on special topics, and perhaps might
be useful in freshmen brief preparation for some of the practice court work.
7. No teacher of "Legal Method" should neglect careful study of Professor Jones'
timely Notes On The Teaching Of Legal Method, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13 (1948).
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will be to fill in the gaps with challenging examples of work done and to be
done. All students should at some time be introduced to the problems of
judicial tenure, appointment, lawyer responsibilities, national lawyers' as-
sociations and legal service facilities (legal aid, public defender and legal
service officer). The materials in this volume are excellent background.
It seems that in a work of this nature only surface features of the profession
are represented. In my opinion more should be given of the seamy side of the
profession, of the neglected suitors on the lower levels of justice, of the many
problems which must be faced by the bar for maximizing its contributions,
and of the shortcomings of legal administration. For example, what are
the powers for good and bad of these lawyer organizations? How do they
mesh with democracy in a crisis? One of the articles discussed the Ameri-
can Bar Association's contributions to American foreign policy. What are
those contributions? Is it the opposition to the Covenant on Human Rights?
Does its support of the United Nations extend to compromising a conserva-
tive tradition? Whether or not one may agree with the particular activi-
ties of lawyer organizations in this field the fact is that American lawyers
do seek to play an active role in foreign policy making. There is no time
like the freshman year to impress that sense of intellectual responsibility upon
the law student which will enable him to approach domestic as well as foreign
policy judgments with the urge to discover the living issues involved and to
seek to harmonize them. Thus the materials in this chapter are excellent
provided the teacher goes byond them and acquaints the student with the
deeper issues and activities involved. But is there a book which the teacher
does not have to go beyond ?8
It is clear to me that I do not know the best kind of introductory course,
and I am doubtful if there is one best kind. It is equally clear to me that an
introductory course must be integrated with the curriculum, the faculty,
the policies, and the spirit of the individual school. In a general manner
one may group American law schools into three or four classes. By far the
larger group consists of those schools with resources and facilities which are
quite limited in comparison with the five or six vast institutions. Where
courses are offered in legal institutions, legal history, legal philosophy, or
where there is a large and diverse faculty subjecting the student to the vary-
ing streams of historical, social, political, sociological and philosophical
thought correlated with the legal, then the emphasis of a course in Legal
Method and Legal System would differ from that in institutions where these
factors are absent or differ markedly. Therefore, with the same materials two
or more different courses might be offered. With these variables in mind, I
would seek to go beyond these materials in several ways, among which
might be: (1) demonstrate the uses of specific social science materials by
drawing upon the collective experience of the class-man's emotions, habits
8. Enough materials are presented on Legal Ethics to furnish the nucleus of several
lectures on the subject.
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and customs, his theories of living together in organized political units, his
theories of making a living, his theories of right, wrong, good and just. (2)
Emphasize other problems of Jurisprudence, but on a freshman level. (8)
Demonstrate the means of handling legislation as authority, source of law,
and as means of satisfying social needs. (4) Locate our legal system and
its institutions within the evolutionary pattern of legal systems of the world
and illustrate the problems of adjustment of systems in a changing world.
(5) Discuss the international legal system within the context of the world's
legal problems and establish a means of comparison with the national sys-
tems. (6) Highlight lawyer-community responsibilities; and (7) illustrate
gaps in effective legal administration.
The great merit of these books is that they lend themselves to this form
of treatment, because the authors have left many jumping off places for
teacher excursion. However, if the teacher wishes solely to follow the texts
he may do so and doubtless will find the process rewarding. The fact that
these volumes do not include all that I would give in an introductory course,
or the fact that I might place different emphasis on many of the materials,
does not in my judgment illustrate that the authors have failed in their ef-
forts. To me it means that their bait (the materials) had to appeal to many
fish (market variables, e.g. teachers and schools) who would catch the hook
and run with it in several different directions within the same pond. By ap-
pealing to a diverse market the authors have amply fulfilled their purpose.
Being more complex, and the real meaty volume of the pair, Legal Method
is a superior book with superb craftsmanship demonstrated by the selec-
tion, arrangement and preparation of materials. The book should be most
teachable. Although less time need be devoted to the shorter Legal Systn,
it bears the same marks of skill, and its materials just cannot be avoided if
the student is to have any perspective, or to be vocal, about the structural legal
world beyond the law school. The experimenters with introductory ma-
terials will welcome these volumes to the testing laboratory.0
JAY MURPHYt
9. Note the present availability of Simpson and Stone's three volumes on LAW AND
Socm~r (1948, 1949) as new tools for the experimenters, and the problems of using
volume one, LAW AxD Socwry Ix EVOLUTION (1948), in an introductory course given
by the reviewer, Book Review, 1 ALA. LAW Rzv. 333 (1949). See an experiment being
born in the stimulating discussion by Professor Ehrenzweig in 2 J. LECAL EDUC. 359
(1950) through the use of the Simpson and Stone materials.
t Professor of Law, University of Alabama Law School.
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